A comprehensive definition of distribution Distributions of contributed capital Distributions via creation of membership interests Distributions upon cancellation of membership interests Non-commercial loans involving closely held entities and their members Distributions by associate entities Private use assets held in entities
A comprehensive definition of distributionRecommendation 12.1 Use of a comprehensive definition of distributionThat a common concept of distribution: (i) apply to all entities taxed under the entity regime; and (ii) capture all provision of value for other than full consideration, between entities and members in their capacity as members. Taxing companies (including co-operatives), trusts and limited partnerships under an entity taxation system requires a definition of distribution that, as far as possible, can be applied consistently to the entities covered by the system. A broad definition is also necessary to ensure that members (particularly individuals) are not able to extract gains from entities for consumption or personal investment without paying tax at their marginal tax rate. A consistent, broad definition thereby contributes to the fairness of the entity tax system. A robust definition also needs to take account of the fact that distributions can be indirectly effected through dealings involving associates of the entity or of the member, so treating such dealings as distributions. Distributions involve transfers of value from the entity to members in their capacity as members. Distributions are distinguished from other transactions between entities and their members as they occur in a membership capacity and not some other capacity (such as contractor or employee). Value can be shifted from an entity to a member in four main ways: (i) a payment of money (such as a dividend or a distribution to a beneficiary) by the entity without consideration in return; (ii) the transfer of an asset by the entity at less than fair value, including the making of a loan at less than commercial interest rates; (iii) the provision of services by the entity, including the use of assets, at less than fair value; and (iv) the release of a liability by the entity at less than fair value consideration for that release. A distribution would also result from a member's transferring assets, providing services or releasing liabilities to the entity at more than fair value, rather than the reverse. All ways of transferring value to members should ideally have the same tax consequences for the entity and for the member, so that no method changes the tax liability of the entity or of the member compared with any other method. Thus, each method should, for example, produce the same credit for tax paid by the entity. For this reason distribution treatment should generally take precedence over the taxing of the transfer of value by other provisions such as those relating to value shifting or debt forgiveness. The recommendation is essentially Option 1 in Chapter 18 of A Platform for Consultation. Implication of the comprehensive definition of distribution for Division 7A and FBTFor private companies, a similar wide definition of dividend currently applies under Division 7A of the 1936 Act. The introduction of the general wide definition will allow the removal of many of the provisions currently in that division. The main differences between Division 7A and the recommendation are that Division 7A does not currently apply: where a private company provides a service directly to the shareholder, or associate, rather than paying for someone else to provide the service; or to the use of assets, such as the use of a motor vehicle, if the benefit does not amount to the transfer of a property interest in the item being used. Interaction between the wide definition of distribution and FBTThe recommended broad definition of distribution will mean that the separate FBT treatment, proposed in A New Tax System, will not be required for benefits provided to members or their associates in their capacity as members or associates. This treatment is consistent with, but not dependent on, the recommendation that benefits to employees, currently covered by FBT, should in future be included in the taxable income of the individual who receives the benefits (see Recommendation 5.1). The fringe benefits recommendation only applies to members and their associates when they receive benefits in their capacity as employees of an entity rather than as members. If that recommendation is not accepted, the current FBT will continue to apply only to benefits received in an employee capacity. Recommendation 12.2 Treatment of certain discounts provided by widely held entitiesTax treatment of eligible discounts to members (a) That eligible discounts provided to members or their associates under loyalty schemes be disregarded when calculating taxable income. Eligible discounts (b) That for eligibility, discounts referred to in paragraph (a) satisfy the following requirements:
Tax treatment of ineligible discounts to members (c) That a discount not eligible under paragraph (b) be treated as a frankable distribution made by the entity and received by the member or their associate, with providing entities to supply appropriate notification for assessment purposes to members or associates receiving such discounts. Some arrangements -- generally known as shareholder loyalty schemes -- currently operate under which the shareholders of certain public companies (or their operating subsidiaries) are entitled to discounts, which are not available to members of the general public, on purchases from the entity of goods and services in which the entity regularly trades with the public at large. In some cases, members' associates can also be entitled to discounts on the members' account. Recognising current practices, it is considered appropriate for the taxation system to provide a limited form of concession in respect of these member discount schemes offered by widely held entities. In A Platform for Consultation (page 407), the Review discussed the possibility of a $1,000 threshold, similar to that suggested in A New Tax System for taxing shareholder benefits as fringe benefits subject to FBT. The Review has also considered the possibility of a percentage limit on member discounts, for the purposes of limiting any concession. These possibilities are complex and impose substantial compliance costs. A limit on the total dollar value of member discounts is apt to encourage the provision of discounts up to that level to all qualifying members by all qualifying entities, regardless of whether the discounts are commercially reasonable. Administratively, such a limit would require entities to track the levels of discounts provided to each member (or on the member's account), with necessarily substantial compliance costs. A limit on the percentage of member discount again encourages the provision of member discounts up to the specified level, regardless of whether the discounts are commercially reasonable. No one percentage has the same commercial effect across businesses; nor is the discount percentage directly related to the value of the membership interests. Where the discount can apply to any benefit to members, there are significant costs in establishing the base cost compared with that on which the percentage discount must be calculated. In the interests of simplicity and equity, the Review prefers a flexible concession limited by commercial considerations. Eligible discounts must be objectively reasonable, commercially justifiable and not excessive to that commercial purpose, on the basis of an arm's length relationship between the entity and the members who receive the discounts. That means the discounts must be consistent with a fiduciary obligation by the managers and controllers towards the entity. Member discounts will need to relate to the provision of goods or services that the entity makes available to the public in the course of its business. And the discounts must be applied when the benefits -- the goods or services -- are provided to the member, rather than being a subsequent decision distributing value to members in the light of overall performance. Widely held entities are relatively less likely than closely held entities to act to the advantage of a small group of their members. Limiting eligible discounts to those provided by widely held entities whose membership interests are required to be publicly available (by listing or other general availability) lessens the risk of abuse. Taxpayers will disregard such discounts in calculating their taxable income. Where an associate receives the discount on the member's account, the associate will also disregard any discount in calculating their taxable income. Ineligible discounts may arise where an entity does not qualify to provide eligible discounts, or discounts fail to satisfy the other requirements specified. In such circumstances, the discounts will be treated as a normal frankable distribution. Applying a profits first ruleRecommendation 12.3 A profits first ruleThat distributions from entities to members be treated as income of the members to the extent of available profits of the entities. Distributions to members should be treated as coming from profits to the extent of the entity's available profits, and hence be included in the members' taxable income and be subject to imputation arrangements. Members generally acquire their interest in an entity to share in its profits while they remain members. A profits first rule (discussed in Chapter 19 of A Platform for Consultation) best ensures fairness among members and simplicity of the entity tax system. Existing law gives companies and trusts some discretion as to whether distributions are out of profits or contributed capital. This can result in deferral of tax, as well as the streaming of profits and contributed capital according to members' tax positions. Currently, complex specific anti-avoidance provisions are aimed at limiting tax benefits flowing from such discretion. Implementation of the profits first rule and other related entity reforms will enable these specific anti-avoidance provisions to be repealed (Recommendation 6.6), reflecting the structural nature of these proposals. The available profits of an entity will be measured as the excess of the net assets of the entity over its contributed capital (subject to Recommendation 12.4). Distributions to members in excess of available profits will be treated as being from contributed capital and will generally reduce the tax value of the member's interest. Distributions which cancel a member's interest in an entity would be treated as coming proportionally from the available profits and contributed capital of the entity (with the exception of on-market buy-backs for practical reasons) -- see Recommendation 12.17. Recommendation 12.4 Use of accounting records for the profits first ruleThat entities be able to rely on their accounting records (if kept in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles) in applying the profits first rule if the amount of a distribution does not exceed the available profits in those accounts. While A Platform for Consultation (page 427) noted that, in practice, book values could be relied on in applying the profits first rule greater certainty will be achieved by providing an explicit `safe harbour' in the legislation. The profits first rule proposed in Recommendation 12.3 treats an entity distribution as coming from profits to the extent that the entity has available profits. Where there are in fact no available profits, distributions would be treated as coming from contributed capital. Under this approach, the available profits of an entity are equal to the fair value of the entity's net assets less its contributed capital. Concerns were raised in consultations that a fair value rule would have a significant compliance cost for taxpayers. Such a rule could require valuation of all assets and liabilities to be carried out before every distribution, even where accounting records would satisfactorily establish that the distribution was out of profits. If an entity maintains accounts prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, the profits in those accounts (adjusted if necessary for differences between contributed capital for tax purposes and capital for accounting purposes) will be acceptable in establishing that a distribution is out of profits. Entities in such cases will not need to establish the fair value of assets before making the distribution. For most entities that are ongoing and not being wound-up, it will usually be the case that the use of accounting records will recognise a distribution as coming entirely from profits. Entities could, nevertheless, choose to use fair values in preference to book values should they wish to do so. If a distribution exceeds profits recorded in the entity's accounts, it will be necessary to establish the fair value of assets in order to determine the extent to which there are profits (generally unrealised gains) not recognised in those accounts. If the accounts of an entity do not accord with generally accepted accounting principles, they will not be acceptable for determining whether a distribution is out of profits. Recommendation 12.5 Specific exceptions to the profits first ruleThat distributions of the following amounts be specific exceptions to the profits first rule: Current year gains on pre-CGT trust assets (i) if the gains are distributed in the year of realisation -- capital gains realised on pre-CGT assets which are held in trusts prior to the date of announcement of these arrangements; Current year exempt gains on pre-announcement trust assets (ii) if distributed in the year of realisation -- the indexation component or goodwill exemption component of capital gains (or substitute capital gains exclusions arising from other recommendations of the Review) realised on post-CGT assets which are held in trusts prior to the date of announcement of these arrangements; Trust income taxed outside entity regime (iii) regardless of when the income is distributed -- retained income of a trust which was taxed before the trust became part of the new entity tax system (see Recommendation 12.7); and Distributions to members by associate entity (iv) distributions to a member of an entity made by an associate of the entity, where the associate is itself an entity (to which separate provisions will apply -- see Recommendation 12.24). The exceptions recommended, are intended to ensure that individuals receive the same treatment in some important respects in relation to existing assets held in trusts. Exceptions to the profits first rule that largely reflected the transitional arrangements for trusts proposed in A New Tax System (page 124) were canvassed in A Platform for Consultation (pages 437-438). Concerns were raised in consultations that those exceptions were too limited in scope or too restricted in time (for example, only certain amounts distributed within the year of realisation) and overly complex. Recommendation 12.5(iii) is a necessary extension of the proposals in A New Tax System. It differs from the option discussed in A Platform for Consultation (page 436) by not applying a five year time limit in respect of prior-taxed income. Applying the time limit would require complicated tax value adjustments for undistributed amounts at the end of the period. The exception applies whether the income was taxed to the entity or another person (for example, a presently entitled beneficiary of a trust). It also applies to income taxed after commencement of the new entity tax system, for example, income of a trust which is initially an excluded trust and later becomes subject to entity taxation. Recommendation 12.5(ii) caters for the changes recommended to the taxation of capital gains (Recommendations 18.1 and 18.6) by maintaining the commitment in A New Tax System in relation to treatment of capital gains on existing post-CGT assets in trusts. Under Recommendation 18.1, however, entities will have the indexed cost bases on their post-CGT assets `frozen' at 30 September 1999, and the 50 per cent capital gains exclusion will not apply. Recommendations 12.5(i) and (ii) accordingly need to apply from the date of announcement of these arrangements, rather than the commencement of the new entity system. The earlier start date will address the incentive companies would otherwise have to shift post-CGT assets into trusts prior to the commencement of the entity tax regime. Providing an even wider exception, such as for purported distributions of all transitional contributed capital of trusts, would be contrary to the objective of applying the same regime to trusts as to other entities. It is not recommended that companies receive any transitional relief from the profits first rule. It was suggested in consultations that exceptions similar to those available in the United States' tax code be provided. The United States' tax code contains a similar provision to the profits first rule, generally requiring distributions to be out of earnings and profits in the first instance. That requirement also applies to distributions in connection with a cancellation or redemption of stock. However, there is an exception if the distribution is substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholding being redeemed or if it terminates the shareholder's entire interest, and in certain other cases. Given the availability of the `slice' approach (Recommendation 12.17), additional exceptions to the profits first rule by analogy to the United States' provisions have not been recommended. The slice approach will apply to cancellations or redemptions of membership interests, and will allow contributed capital attributable to the redeemed or cancelled membership interests to be distributed, proportionately, ahead of retained profits. Measuring contributed capitalRecommendation 12.6 Measuring the contributed capital of entitiesFor entities: general principles (a) That after the commencement of the new entity tax system, the contributed capital of an entity consist of amounts provided:
For trusts: inclusion of exempt goodwill gains (b) That after the commencement of the new entity tax system, the contributed capital of a trust include realised exempt gains under the small business CGT goodwill exemption (or recommended small business assets exemption). For companies: inclusion of liquidation gains on pre-CGT assets (c) That after the commencement of the new entity tax system, the contributed capital of a company include realised gains from sale of pre-CGT assets when that company is liquidated. Commencement provisions for existing entities (d) That for entities existing at the commencement date of the new entity tax system, their transitional contributed capital consist of:
General principleA system of entity taxation needs to recognise amounts contributed to an entity by or on behalf of its members, past or present, and the return by the entity of those amounts to its members. In A Platform for Consultation, categories of amounts were specified that could be taken to be a contribution of capital to a company (pages 429-430), a trust (page 431-432) and a limited partnership (page 437) after the commencement of the entity tax system. Examples included amounts settled on a trust and receipts from the issue of new shares. The general principles underlying the various types of amounts specified in A Platform for Consultation are that a payment to an entity constitutes a contribution of capital to the entity if it is: provided as consideration for the issue of membership interests in the entity (for example, an issue of new shares or units); provided to satisfy an obligation in respect of existing membership interests (for example, a call on unpaid amounts on shares); or provided to allow membership interests in an entity to be created or their value enhanced (for example, settlements on a trust in respect of a third party). Trusts and exempt goodwill gainsA New Tax System proposed that, for both existing and future businesses in trusts, the `current' tax status be maintained for distributions out of exempt CGT goodwill gains. This is achieved by including such exempt amounts in the contributed capital of a trust. That proposed treatment needs adjustment to reflect Recommendation 17.5 that the existing CGT goodwill exemption for small business be replaced with a small business assets exemption of 50 per cent of all capital gains arising on the disposal of active assets (including goodwill). All exempt amounts under the new small business exemption will be included in contributed capital on realisation. Pre-CGT assets and liquidationsIncluding realised gains from sale of pre-CGT assets in a company's contributed capital upon liquidation -- Recommendation 12.6(c) -- preserves the effect of the current law, which treats these distributions like returns of share capital. A return of such contributed capital in respect of a pre-CGT membership interest will not be assessable. This is consistent with the treatment proposed in A New Tax System (page 124). Simplicity and consistency are served by formally including the pre-CGT gains in contributed capital, and not allowing a special discretion to distribute as capital outside the operation of the profits first and slice approaches. For trusts, the same result is achieved through the commencement arrangements for taxing trusts like companies. These will include realised gains on pre-CGT assets in a trust's contributed capital whenever the gains are realised -- Recommendation 12.6(d)(i). Other transitional rulesFor entities existing at the commencement of the new entity tax system, it is necessary to have transitional rules to determine their starting contributed capital that recognise previous contributions (and returns of capital). Amounts will also be added to contributed capital, in effect, to retain the existing tax treatment in respect of certain assets held in trusts. For companies, those transitional rules will be based on a company's share capital account adjusted for tainted or unpaid amounts. For limited partnerships (which are already taxed like companies), contributed capital will be the amount that would have been the balance of the limited partnership's contributed capital account if they had observed the general principles set out above. For trusts, the options discussed in A Platform for Consultation (pages 434-436) reflect the proposed transitional arrangements in A New Tax System (page 114). The basic principle behind the proposals in A New Tax System is to maintain the same substantive tax treatment of certain future gains on the realisation of pre-commencement assets as would have been achieved if trusts had continued to not be taxed like companies. This is achieved by treating certain exempt gains as contributed capital. The future gains identified in A New Tax System were realised gains on pre-CGT assets, indexed component of realised gains on post-CGT assets and exempt CGT goodwill gains for small business. As discussed above with respect to exempt CGT goodwill gains, these proposed arrangements require modification to reflect other recommendations of the Review regarding the tax treatment of assets. In particular, the general 50 per cent exclusion (or choice of indexed cost base) available for eligible capital gains of individuals (see Recommendation 18.2) will also be available to trusts in respect of assets held prior to the date of announcement of these arrangements. Realised gains on assets held at the date of announcement that are exempt either by indexation or choice of the 50 per cent CGT exclusion will be included in contributed capital on realisation. Recommendation 12.7 Exclusion of prior taxed income from contributed capitalThat the prior-taxed income of trusts be treated separately and not be included in the contributed capital of an entity. Prior-taxed income is the retained income of a trust taxed prior to the entity becoming subject to the entity tax system. The distribution of prior-taxed income needs to take account of its prior tax status, and hence receive a different tax treatment (that is, not be part of taxable income nor reduce the tax value of membership interests) from distributions of profit or contributed capital. The option outlined in A Platform for Consultation (page 436) was for prior-taxed income to form part of a trust's contributed capital, but to be subject to different tax consequences upon distribution to members. However, the very different tax treatment of prior-taxed income, as against contributed capital generally, makes it more practical to deal with it separately and not include it in contributed capital. Separate treatment will not result in any substantive change to the treatment of prior-taxed income under the general entity tax system. Compared with the options outlined in A Platform for Consultation in Chapter 19, consequential changes will be required to the rules for the contributed capital of trusts existing at the commencement of the new tax system and to the operation of the profits first rule (see Recommendation 12.5(iii)). It will simplify the legislative rules required. Recommendation 12.8 Contributed capital accountThat all entities taxed under the new entity tax system be required to keep a contributed capital account for tax purposes. All entities will need to know their contributed capital for tax purposes in various situations. For example, they will need to know their contributed capital when applying the profits first rule to a dividend or when applying the `slice' approach to buying back a share off-market. For companies, the Review outlined two options in A Platform for Consultation (pages 428-431) for determining contributed capital -- by reference to existing tax rules that rely on the company's share capital account or by requiring companies to maintain a separate contributed capital account (as for trusts and limited partnerships). Concerns were expressed in consultation that requiring maintenance of a separate contributed capital account would involve significant additional reporting and information obligations for companies. The existing approach of relying on a company's share capital account can be complex, relies on specific anti-avoidance provisions to prevent abuse, and is not relevant to trusts or limited partnerships (as they do not have a share capital account and keep capital accounts in a different way). It would also be difficult to integrate the existing approach with a profits first rule, as that rule may treat distributions as being profit or contributed capital whether they are debited to a company's share capital account or not. The Review recognises that there will be some ongoing compliance costs associated with companies maintaining a separate contributed capital account for tax purposes -- consistent with other entities in the new entity tax system -- but does not believe that they would be particularly onerous. Recommendation 12.9 Contributed capital sub-accounts for multiple classesSub-accounts for each class of membership interest (a) That entities with multiple classes of membership interests keep records (sub-accounts) of the contributed capital attributable to each class of membership interests. Definition of `class of membership interests' (b) That a class of membership interests consist of all those membership interests in an entity having identical or strictly proportional rights in relation to distributions from the entity. Where a distribution from an entity to a member is part of a process that results directly in the cancellation of a membership interest in the entity (for example, an off-market share buy-back), the `slice' approach will apply (Recommendation 12.17). The slice approach involves ascertaining the slice of contributed capital, taxed profits, and untaxed profits attributable to the cancelled membership interest. The contributed capital attributable to a membership interest is clear cut where the entity consists of a single class of membership interests, such as ordinary shares. Separate classes require determination of the amount of contributed capital of the entity attributable to each class in order to calculate the appropriate slice (as discussed in Appendix C of Chapter 19 in A Platform for Consultation). Rules for determining the contributed capital of each class of interests in an entity are set out in the draft exposure legislation accompanying this Report. For the purposes of the entity tax system, a class of membership interests will consist of all those membership interests in an entity having identical, or strictly proportional, rights in relation to distributions from the entity. Deciding who is a memberRecommendation 12.10 Principles for defining `membership interest'That, subject to Recommendation 12.11 (dealing with debt-like interests), a person be deemed to have a membership interest in an entity if the person satisfies one of the following conditions: Specified interests (i) the person falls within one of the following categories:
Rights in respect of management and control (ii) the person has an interest in the entity that carries rights in respect of the management and control of the entity (beyond those voting rights accepted in the Corporations Law as consistent with the protection of the interests of a non-member creditor); or Where returns contingent on issuer discretion/performance (iii) if not the holder of a specified interest, the person has:
The need for definitionThis recommendation provides a broad definition of `membership interest'. Interests that fall within this definition which are not excluded by Recommendation 12.11 broadly get returns from the entity that are frankable and not deductible to the entity; other interests (for example, debt) get returns from the entity which are not frankable but are deductible to the entity. The different tax treatment of debt and equity will continue to exist in the tax law. This means that the distinction between membership interests and non-membership interests is an important borderline, particularly as regards non-resident and tax-exempt investors (see page 198 of A Platform for Consultation). The distinction between membership interests and non-membership interests needs to be as certain as possible to enable companies and other entities to raise capital in the knowledge of the tax consequences. The positioning of the membership/non-membership borderline should seek to avoid inconsistent treatment of effectively identical interests. Inevitably, however, investors will structure their arrangements according to how the borderline is drawn. Key testsThe key element that distinguishes debt from equity is a lower level of economic risk, resulting from ordering of access to the assets of the entity in the event of insolvency. The level of risk is also reflected in the various contractual features attached to debt, such as covenants and pledges, imposed by debtholders to manage that risk. The risk differential does not, however, provide the basis for a practical and general distinction between all debt and equity interests. The recommended approach therefore looks to tangible considerations for distinguishing member interests from other interests -- equity from debt -- as follows. Whether the taxpayer has an interest that comes under any of the familiar specific categories of membership. For example, a member for tax purposes will include a member of a company, or of a registered managed investment scheme, for the purposes of the Corporations Law as well as a beneficiary, or a discretionary object, of a trust and a partner in a limited partnership. This is the effect of Recommendation 12.10(i). Whether the taxpayer holds substantial rights in the management or control of an entity. A membership interest (subject to Recommendation 12.11) is indicated by the associated power over the distribution of gains of the entity. This is the effect of Recommendation 12.10(ii). The test is needed to ensure that parties such as `golden' share holders, trust controllers and the like will be members so that transfers of value to them by an entity because of their status will be distributions. Familiar exceptions found in the Corporations Law (for example, voting consistent with the protection of non-member interests) would not connote membership for tax purposes. Whether the taxpayer has rights to returns that include a share of profit or a discretionary amount giving access to available profit -- that is, whether the rights to returns are contingent on the economic performance of the issuer. This is the effect of Recommendation 12.10(iii). Contingency here is about the absence of a right to a contractually specified and fixed return, not about its collectability. So a return is not contingent (in this defined sense) because the payer may not be able to meet its obligation when a contractually-specified payment is due. Nor is it contingent merely because it is based on an uncertain component, as rent with a gross turnover component may be. Interests issued by an entity that may or will convert into a membership interest also provide a return affected by the economic performance of the issuer and should be treated as membership interests unless excluded by the debt test in Recommendation 12.11. Because of the requirement that these convertible interests be issued by the entity into whose membership interests they convert, derivatives such as options that are created by third parties over membership interests in an entity will not be covered. These tests identify interests which represent a membership interest in an entity. They do not extend to interests issued by one entity which provide an equivalent exposure to a membership interest in another, unrelated entity. Therefore, for example, an equity-linked bond will not constitute a membership interest in the issuer if the returns on the bond are unrelated to the economic performance of the issuer itself. Recommendation 12.10(ii) will not necessarily result in preference shares being treated as equity, as preference shares do not necessarily have substantial rights of voting or control. Such shares will often be membership interests on essentially historical/formal grounds -- under Recommendation 12.10(i) -- but the debt test in Recommendation 12.11 could still exclude them from the definition of equity for taxation purposes. Some exclusionsRecommendation 12.11 modifies the broad definition of membership interest in this recommendation, looking to risk considerations to help fine tune the borderline to ensure debt-like interests are excluded from the definition of membership interests. The breadth of the definition will also be reduced by excluding from Recommendation 12.10(iii) employment contracts which provide remuneration on the basis of economic performance of the employer. This exception is necessary to prevent performance-linked salary bonuses being paid as franked dividends rather than salary. The exception means that a salary package that includes a bonus linked to profitability of the employer will never be a membership interest. This combination of tests aims to achieve consistency, simplicity and clarity of treatment while promoting integrity of the system. These aims are made more important by the extension of the entity tax system to apply to a wide range of legal structures, each with its own differing types of membership interest. Recommendation 12.11 Exclusion of debt interests from membership interestsWhere contractually specified payments determinative (a) That an interest which would otherwise be a membership interest be excluded from the definition of membership interest if the terms under which the interest is issued give rise to an effective or contractually `non-contingent' right of the holder to receive, or a contractually (or effectively) `non-contingent' obligation of the issuer to pay, a specified amount or amounts (the repayment amount) that equal or exceed the amount paid for the interest (the investment amount):
Certain `contingencies' disregarded (b) That `non-contingent' rights and obligations include rights and obligations that are, in legal form, subject to no contingency, and also rights and obligations that, as a matter of commercial substance, are not affected by any contingencies imposed by the terms of the instrument because, for example, they are immaterially remote or artificial. (c) That, if the repayment amount described in paragraph (a) is also linked to an index (for example, the Consumer Price Index or a commodities index), the application of that index be disregarded in determining whether the test is satisfied. Benchmark interest rate (d) That the discount rate used to calculate present values in paragraph (a)(ii) be in line with the interest rate on the ordinary debt of the issuer (or equivalent entity). Non-commercial arrangements not debt interests (e) That paragraph (a) not apply in relation to non-commercial arrangements such as a `non-commercial' loan by a member to a closely held entity. In consequence of the continuing debt/equity borderline, this recommendation seeks to exclude from membership interests those interests with lower associated risk. Without this approach for identifying `debt-like' instruments, instruments issued by entities that would be defined as membership interests would include: debentures where a minor part of the returns are made contingent on a nominated feature of the economic performance of the issuer; redeemable preference shares that provide fixed returns and repayment of principal on terms which make them equivalent to bonds; convertible notes issued on terms which render conversion unlikely (therefore obligating the issuer to repay their issue price); and converting preference shares likely to convert at the end of their term into a number of ordinary shares whose total value is equal only to the issue price of the converting preference share (effectively ensuring that investors only get back what they originally invested, and possibly obliging the issuer to buy back the shares before conversion to prevent an unacceptable dilution of its share price by issuing a large number of ordinary shares to converting preference shareholders). Minimising uncertaintyThe proposed approach minimises uncertainty at the border between debt and equity by focusing on a single determinative factor (Option 2 on page 202 of A Platform for Consultation). This factor -- the contractually guaranteed return of the original investment -- brings to the fore the lower level of economic risk that distinguishes debt from equity. Minimising uncertainty is consistent with the common theme running through the consultations on this issue: more importance is attached to the provision of certainty than on precisely where the distinction between membership interests and non-membership interests is drawn. In this regard, a `facts and circumstances' test (described in Option 1 on page 201 of A Platform for Consultation) is not considered appropriate by taxpayers -- the United States' experience with such a test indicates that it is unable to provide sufficient certainty. It is not possible, however, to provide absolute certainty. Most particularly, it is not practicable to limit the right to returns valued in the debt test to rights that are subject to no contingency at all other than the solvency of the issuer. Taxpayers would easily be able to impose artificial contingencies in order to pass or fail the debt test as desired. Hence, the recommended debt test ensures that `non-contingent' rights include rights that are formally contingent, but the contingencies are immaterially remote or artificial. This issue is discussed in example 12.1 below.
In effect, satisfaction of the repayment tests provided in Recommendation 12.11(a) will generally suffice to determine that an arrangement is a debt interest -- notwithstanding the presence of contingent return elements in that arrangement. Excluding consideration, under Recommendation 12.11(c), of any indices to which an interest's returns are subject adds strength to the characterisation of the interest as debt on the basis of the up-front assessment of whether the repayment amount is reasonably likely to exceed the investment amount. Nominal value versus present value debt testsThe present value debt test -- Recommendation 12.11(a)(ii) -- will ensure that all instruments where the present value of future `non-contingent' returns (calculated at the benchmark discount rate specified in Recommendation 12.11(d)) exceeds the issue price will be treated as debt. Satisfaction of this test demonstrates that the holder of the instrument is bearing no more risk in relation to the economic performance of the issuer than the holder of an ordinary debt instrument. The present value debt test is necessary for more complex hybrid instruments. For example, a convertible note that converts at the end of its term into a fixed value of ordinary shares of the issuer will be categorised as debt if that value, combined with the value of other non-contingent returns, equals or exceeds, in present value terms, its issue price. If the total value of the non-contingent returns is less than that amount, or if the conversion is into a fixed number of shares (irrespective of their value), then the note will be treated as a membership interest. The same principles apply to converting preference shares. For non-converting instruments repayable within 20 years of issue the compliance costs of applying the present value test are not justified. That is why the simpler nominal value test is proposed for such instruments. Non-commercial arrangementsNon-commercial arrangements could nominally satisfy the debt test without representing genuine debt. Some examples include non-commercial loans to associated entities (Recommendation 12.23), and artificial arrangements under which beneficiaries of family trusts pay a nominal sum for the right to be a discretionary object of the trust where the trustee guarantees repayment of the nominal sum within 20 years. As Recommendation 12.11(e) recognises, it would be inappropriate to allow such arrangements to be treated as debt. Distributions of contributed capitalRecommendation 12.12 Capital distributions in respect of fixed interest in entityCapital distribution to reduce tax value (a) That, subject to paragraph (b), a distribution of contributed capital in respect of a member's fixed interest in an entity:
Capital distribution where no tax value has applied (b) That where there is such a distribution, and the member at that time did not have (and previously never had) a tax value in respect of that interest, that distribution be non-taxable. The treatment of distributions of contributed capital under the new entity tax system is discussed in Appendix A to Chapter 19 of A Platform for Consultation. Appendix A needs to be read in conjunction with the paragraphs in Chapter 22 which clarify the rules for cost bases of beneficial interests in trusts. A distribution of contributed capital will generally result in a reduction in the tax value of the membership interest held by the member who receives the distribution. Without the reduction in tax value the member could manufacture a capital loss on the sale of the membership interest. If the contributed capital distribution exceeds the tax value (reflecting returns greater than original capital contribution), the excess is appropriately included in the member's income. In certain situations the recipient of a distribution of contributed capital does not have a tax value in respect of the fixed interest which gave rise to the distribution. For example, a settlement on a trust on behalf of a third party could lead to a beneficiary having no tax value. Recommendation 12.12(b) will ensure that, in such circumstances, the distribution will not be included in the recipient's income (so as to effectively not tax the settlor's gift in the above example). Recommendation 12.12(b) will not apply, for example, if the membership interest originally had a tax value, but that value has been reduced to zero due to receipt, in the past, of distributions of contributed capital. Additionally, Recommendation 12.12(a) will reduce the tax value of the member's fixed interest in the entity where someone else receives the distribution of contributed capital, provided that the member either currently has (or previously had) a tax value in respect of the interest. This situation could arise if, for example, a distribution of contributed capital is made to an associate of a member of a trust, rather than directly to that member. This approach will ensure that the tax value reduction rules apply appropriately whether the contributed capital distribution is made to the member or to an associate. Recommendation 12.13 Capital distributions to object of discretionary trustThat if, as the consequence of the exercise of a discretion by a trustee, contributed capital is distributed to an object of the trust, it is neither: (i) taxable in the hands of the discretionary object -- provided the object did not have (and previously never had) a tax value in respect of that interest; nor (ii) subject to fringe benefits taxation. In A Platform for Consultation (pages 495-498), the Review presented options for ensuring that distributions of contributed capital by discretionary trusts would not be taxed in the hands of the discretionary object. The recommendation is considered the easiest method of ensuring this outcome. The profits first rule in Recommendation 12.3 (see also Recommendations 12.4 and 12.5) means that a distribution made by a continuing discretionary trust will be taxable to the discretionary object to the extent that the trust has `available profits'. Where no profits are available, the full amount of the distribution will be contributed capital and tax free in the hands of the object. Similarly, where the trust fully vests (effectively, winds up), the contributed capital component of any distribution will be free from tax in the hands of the object. These rules will mean that for a discretionary trust with profits, contributed capital could not be distributed until after the profits (including net unrealised gains) had been distributed, which often may not happen until the trust is vested. Distributions via creation of membership interestsRecommendation 12.14 Provision of additional membership interests to membersWhere additional interests qualify as distributions (a) That the provision among members for no or inadequate consideration, of additional membership interests be a distribution for entity tax purposes -- except where it would not of itself be expected to change the total fair value of any member's membership interests (that is, there be no distribution where additional interests are provided proportionately). Value of such distributions (b) That subject to paragraph (c), the value of the distribution be the fair value of the additional interests provided less any consideration. (c) That where members of a widely held entity have a choice between receiving additional interests or an alternative amount, the value of the distribution be the alternative amount. The provision of additional membership interests among members of an entity (for example, by way of bonus units or a share split) can be a substitute for a distribution, as discussed at pages 417 to 421 of A Platform for Consultation. Treating such cases as distributions reflects the substance of the transaction and assists, in conjunction with other measures, in limiting capital streaming, so permitting the repeal (see Recommendation 6.6) of specific anti-avoidance sections (sections 45 and 45A of the 1936 Act). While the value shifting among members involved in cases other than proportionate issues theoretically could be dealt with by value shifting rules, in practice such rules would be unworkable (Recommendation 12.16). Distribution treatment is the simplest approach to the issue and is used in a number of countries. The amount of the distribution as a general rule will be the fair value of the additional interest provided less any consideration paid by the member for that interest (Recommendation 12.1), as for the general case of the passing of assets by an entity to a member. However, as suggested in A Platform for Consultation (page 419), where members of a widely held entity have a choice between receiving a distribution or additional membership interests (for example, via bonus shares), it would be logical for the value of the alternative distribution to be used. For the provision of additional membership interests not to be a distribution will necessitate that no substantive change occur in the proportionate interests of members in the entity. For example, additional interests may be provided to all members in uniform proportion to their existing holdings, such as through a general bonus share issue. In these cases there is not likely to be a shift in value between members arising from the provision of additional membership interests. To deal adequately with entities with multiple classes of membership interests, Recommendation 12.14(a) is worded as a value shift test -- where no shift in value of members' interests would reasonably be expected, there is no distribution. Recommendation 12.15 Tax values of existing and additional membership interestsTax values for interests via distributions (a) That for a distribution made by way of the provision of additional membership interests:
Tax values for proportionate issues (b) That for proportionate issues, the tax value of existing interests of a member be spread across the additional and existing interests of the member. Where a distribution by way of additional membership interests is from profits or prior-taxed income, the provision of additional membership interests is recharacterised by Recommendation 12.15(a) as a distribution of profit to members, who then use that profit to purchase the additional interests in the entity. That gives rise to a tax value of the additional interest equal to the amount (actually or notionally) paid. Where the distribution is from contributed capital, the provision of additional membership interests is recharacterised by Recommendation 12.15(a)(ii) as a distribution of contributed capital to members (which reduces tax values), who then return that capital in exchange for additional interests in the entity (which increase tax values). In net terms, therefore, there is no change in tax values, except to the extent consideration was paid as part of the arrangement. However, it is necessary to spread the existing tax values over the existing and additional interests to prevent the manufacture of realisation losses (through the sale of existing interests whose fair value would have fallen while their tax value otherwise remained the same). Any consideration paid for the additional interests will be added to the tax value of those additional interests only. The same considerations apply to proportionate issues (Recommendation 12.15(b)). Where an amount needs to be spread over additional and existing interests, it will be spread so that, for each member, additional interests attract their share of the total tax value of the existing interests in proportion to their share of the total fair value of the new and existing interests of the member (adjusted for any consideration provided or profit distribution element). The balance of the total tax value is then distributed among the existing interests of the member in proportion to their existing tax values. Where an existing membership interest is a pre-CGT interest, some modifications to the above rules are required to maintain the current treatment of pre-CGT assets. For example, additional interests provided in respect of pre-CGT membership interests will also be pre-CGT assets where the additional interests are a distribution entirely from contributed capital or part of a proportionate issue. Recommendation 12.16 Additional membership interests and general value shifting rulesThat where Recommendations 12.14 and 12.15 apply, the proposed generalised value shifting regime not apply. Distributions via membership interests involve a shift of value between members, rather than from an entity to a member. Conceivably then, the general value shifting rules could apply. However, the general value shifting rules are subject to a control test and there is a de minimis exclusion. It is therefore appropriate to apply, as occurs for distributions generally, the specific rules in Recommendations 12.14 and 12.15 in preference to the general value shifting rules. Distributions upon cancellation of
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